### 1NC Shell

**Utopian imagery is dangerous – utopia is impossible and we will create scapegoats and exterminate them**

**Stavrakakis 99** (Yannis, *Lacan and the Political,* Visiting Professor, Department of Government, University of Essex, pages 99-100).

Our age is clearly an age of social fragmentation, political disenchantment and open cynicism characterised by the decline of the political mutations of modern universalism—a universalism that, by replacing God with Reason, reoccupied the ground of a pre-modern aspiration to fully represent and master the essence and the totality of the real. On the political level this universalist fantasy took the form of a series of utopian constructions of a reconciled future society. The fragmentation of our present social terrain and cultural milieu entails the collapse of such grandiose fantasies.1 Today, talk about utopia is usually characterised by a certain ambiguity. For some, of course, utopian constructions are still seen as positive results of human creativity in the socio- political sphere: ‘utopia is the expression of a desire for a better way of being’ (Levitas, 1990:8). Other, more suspicious views, such as the one expressed in Marie Berneri’s book Journey through Utopia, warn—taking into account experiences like the Second World War—of the dangers entailed in trusting the idea of a perfect, ordered and regimented world. For some, instead of being ‘how can we realise our utopias?’, the crucial question has become ‘how can we prevent their final realisation?.... [How can] we return to a non-utopian society, less perfect and more free’ (Berdiaev in Berneri, 1971:309).2 It is particularly the political experience of these last decades that led to the dislocation of utopian sensibilities and brought to the fore a novel appreciation of human finitude, together with a growing suspicion of all grandiose political projects and the meta-narratives traditionally associated with them (Whitebook, 1995:75). All these developments, that is to say the crisis of the utopian imaginary, seem however to leave politics without its prime motivating force: the politics of today is a politics of aporia. In our current political terrain, hope seems to be replaced by pessimism or even resignation. This is a result of the crisis in the dominant modality of our political imagination (meaning utopianism in its various forms) and of our inability to resolve this crisis in a productive way.3 In this chapter, I will try to show that Lacanian theory provides new angles through which we can reflect on our historical experience of utopia and reorient our political imagination beyond its suffocating strait-jacket. Let’s start our exploration with the most elementary of questions: what is the meaning of the current crisis of utopia? And is this crisis a development to be regretted or cherished?

In order to answer these questions it is crucial to enumerate the conditions of possibility and the basic characteristics of utopian thinking. First of all it seems that the need for utopian meaning arises in periods of increased uncertainty, social instability and conflict, when the element of the political subverts the fantasmatic stability of our political reality. Utopias are generated by the surfacing of grave antagonisms and dislocations in the social field. As Tillich has put it ‘all utopias strive to negate the negative...in human existence; it is the negative in that existence which makes the idea of utopia necessary’ (Tillich in Levitas, 1990:103). Utopia then is one of the possible responses to the ever-present negativity, to the real antagonism which is constitutive of human experience. Furthermore, from the time of More’s Utopia (1516) it is conceived as an answer to the negativity inherent in concrete political antagonism. What is, however, the exact nature of this response? Utopias are images of future human communities in which these antagonisms and the dislocations fuelling them (the element of the political) will be forever resolved, leading to a reconciled and harmonious world—it is not a coincidence that, among others, Fourier names his utopian community ‘Harmony’ and that the name of the Owenite utopian community in the New World was ‘New Harmony’. As Marin has put it, utopia sets in view an imaginary resolution to social contradiction; it is a simulacrum of synthesis which dissimulates social antagonism by projecting it onto a screen representing a harmonious and immobile equilibrium (Marin, 1984:61). This final resolution is the essence of the utopian promise.

What I will try to do in this chapter is, first of all, to demonstrate the deeply problematic nature of utopian politics. Simply put, my argument will be that every utopian fantasy construction needs a ‘scapegoat’ in order to constitute itself—the Nazi utopian fantasy and the production of the ‘Jew’ is a good example, especially as pointed out in Žižek’s analysis.4 Every utopian fantasy produces its reverse and calls for its elimination. Put another way, the beatific side of fantasy is coupled in utopian constructions with a horrific side, a paranoid need for a stigmatised scapegoat. The naivety—and also the danger—of utopian structures is revealed when the realisation of this fantasy is attempted. It is then that we are brought close to the frightening kernel of the real: stigmatisation is followed by extermination. This is not an accident. It is inscribed in the structure of utopian constructions; it seems to be the way all fantasy constructions work. If in almost all utopian visions, violence and antagonism are eliminated, if utopia is based on the expulsion and repression of violence (this is its beatific side) this is only because it owes its own creation to violence; it is sustained and fed by violence (this is its horrific side). This repressed moment of violence resurfaces, as Marin points out, in the difference inscribed in the name utopia itself (Marin, 1984:110). What we shall argue is that it also resurfaces in the production of the figure of an enemy. To use a phrase enunciated by the utopianist Fourier, what is ‘driven out through the door comes back through the window’ (is not this a ‘precursor’ of Lacan’s *dictum* that ‘what is foreclosed in the symbolic reappears in the real’?—VII:131).5 The work of Norman Cohn and other historians permits the articulation of a genealogy of this manichean, equivalential way of understanding the world, from the great witch-hunt up to modern anti-Semitism, and Lacanian theory can provide valuable insights into any attempt to understand the logic behind this utopian operation—here the approach to fantasy developed in Chapter 2 will further demonstrate its potential in analysing our political experience. In fact, from the time of his unpublished seminar on *The Formations of the Unconscious,* Lacan identified the utopian dream of a perfectly functioning society as a highly problematic area (seminar of 18 June 1958).

**The alternative is to reject their utopian fantasy in favor of a Lacanian reconceptualization of the political**

**Stavrakakis 99** (Yannis, *Lacan and the Political,* Visiting Professor, Department of Government, University of Essex, pages p 96-98).

According to my reading, Bellamy, Butler and Lane are questioning the value of recognising the effects and the structural causality of the real in society; instead of the political they prioritise politics, in fact traditional fantasmatic politics. This seems to be the kernel of their argument: Even if this move is possible—encircling the unavoidable political modality of the real—is it really desirable, is it ethically and politically satisfactory? The fear behind all these statements is common; it is that the stress on the political qua encounter with the real precludes the possibility of presenting a more or less stable (present or future) ground for ethics and democracy, that it undermines their universal character and the possibility of any final reconciliation at either the subjective or the social level. Frosh is summarising this fear à propos of the issue of human rights: ‘if humanism is a fraud [as Lacan insists] and there is no fundamental human entity that is to be valued in each person [an essence of the psyche maybe?], one is left with no way of defending the “basic rights” of the individual’ (Frosh, 1987:137). In the two final chapters of this book I shall argue that the reason behind all these fears is the continuing hegemony of an ethics of harmony. Against such a position the ethics of the real entails a recognition of the irreducibility of the real and an attempt to institutionalise social lack. Thus it might be possible to achieve an ethically and politically satisfactory institution of the social field beyond the fantasy of closure which has proved so problematic, if not catastrophic. In other words, the best way to organise the social might be one which recognises the ultimate impossibility around which it is always structured. What could be some of the parameters of this new organisation of the social in our late modern terrain? Ulrich Beck’s theory seems to be relevant in this respect. According to our reading of Beck’s schema, contemporary societies are faced with the return of uncertainty, a return of the repressed without doubt, and the inability of mastering the totality of the real. We are forced thus to recognise the ambiguity of our experience and to articulate an auto-critical position towards our ability to master the real. It is now revealed that although repressing doubt and uncertainty can provide a temporary safety of meaning, it is nevertheless a dangerous strategy, a strategy that depends on a fantasmatic illusion. This realisation, contrary to any nihilistic reaction, is nothing but the starting point for a new form of society which is emerging around us, together of course with the reactionary attempts to reinstate an ageing modernity: 96 ENCIRCLING THE POLITICAL Perhaps the decline of the lodestars of primary Enlightenment, the individual, identity, truth, reality, science, technology, and so on, is the prerequisite for the start of an alternative Enlightenment, one which does not fear doubt, but instead makes it the element of its life and survival. (Beck, 1997:161) Is it not striking that Lacanian theory stands at the forefront of the struggle to make us change our minds about all these grandiose fantasies? Beck argues that such an openness towards doubt can be learned from Socrates, Montaigne, and others; it might be possible to add Lacan to this list. In other words, doubt, which threatens our false certainties, can become the nodal point for another modernity that will respect the right to err. Scepticism contrary to a widespread error, makes everything possible again: questions and dialogue of course, as well as faith, science, knowledge, criticism, morality, society, only differently...things unsuspected and incongruous, with the tolerance based and rooted in the ultimate certainty of error. (Beck, 1997:163) In that sense, what is at stake in our current theoretico-political terrain is not the central categories or projects of modernity per se (the idea of critique, science, democracy, etc.), but their ontological status, their foundation. The crisis of their current foundations, weakens their absolutist character and creates the opportunity to ground them in much more appropriate foundations (Laclau, 1988a). Doubts liberate; they make things possible. First of all the possibility of a new vision for society. An anti- utopian vision founded on the principle ‘Dubio ergo sum’ (Beck, 1997:162) closer to the subversive doubtfulness of Montaigne than to the deceptive scepticism of Descartes. Although Lacan thought that in Montaigne scepticism had not acquired the form of an ethic, he nevertheless pointed out that Montaigne is truly the one who has centred himself, not around scepticism but around the living moment of the aphanisis of the subject. And it is in this that he is fruitful, that he is an eternal guide, who goes beyond whatever may be represented of the moment to be defined as a historical turning-point. (XI:223–4) This is a standpoint which is both critical and self-critical: there is no foundation ‘of such a scope and elasticity for a critical theory of society 97 ENCIRCLING THE POLITICAL (which would then automatically be a self-critical theory) as doubt’ (Beck, 1997:173). Doubt, the invigorating champagne of thinking, points to a new modernity ‘more modern than the old, industrial modernity that we know. The latter after all, is based on certainty, on repelling and suppressing doubt’ (ibid.: 173). Beck asks us to fight for ‘a modernity which is beginning to doubt itself, which, if things go well, will make doubt the measure and architect of its self-limitation and self-modification’ (ibid.: 163). He asks us, to use Paul Celan’s phrase, to ‘build on inconsistencies’. This will be a modernity instituting a new politics, a politics recognising the uncertainty of the moment of the political. It will be a modernity recognising the constitutivity of the real in the social. A truly political modernity (ibid.: 5). In the next two chapters I will try to show the way in which Lacanian political theory can act as a catalyst for this change. The current crisis of utopian politics, instead of generating pessimism, can become the starting point for a renewal of democratic politics within a radically transformed ethical framework.

### Link – Utopianism

Their utopian conception is impossible and ensures violence – these conceptions of utopia DIRECTLY influence reality

Stavrakakis 99 (Yannis, Visiting Professor, Department of Government, University of Essex, Lacan and the Political, “The Lacanian Object” p.63-5)

Mac Arthur, Odum and Clements, like Isaac Newton, ‘had tried to make nature into a single, coherent picture where all the pieces fitted firmly together’. All of them tried to reduce the disorderliness or the unknown qualities of nature to a single all-encompassing metaphysical idea (Worster, 1994:400). Even conceptions of nature stressing the element of conflict, such as the Darwinian one, sometimes feel the need to subject this non-perfect image to some discernible goal of nature (for example the ‘constantly increasing diversity of organic types in one area’—Worster, 1994:161) which introduces a certain harmony through the back door. What constantly emerges from this exposition is that when harmony is not present it has to be somehow introduced in order for our reality to be coherent. It has to be introduced through a fantasmatic social construction. 19 One should not get the impression though that this is a mere philosophical discussion. In so far as our constructions of reality influence our behaviour—and this is what they basically do—our fixation on harmony has direct social and political consequences. Reality construction does not take place on a superstructural level. Reality is forced to conform to our constructions of it not only at the spiritual or the intellectual, but also at the material level. But why does it have to be forced to conform? This is due, for instance, to the gap between our harmonious fantasmatic constructions of nature and nature itself, between reality and the real. Our constructions of reality are so strong that nature has to conform to them and not they to nature; reality is conceived as mastering the real. But there is always a certain leftover, a disturbing element destabilising our constructions of nature. This has to be stigmatised, made into a scapegoat and exterminated. The more beatific and harmonious is a social fantasy the more this repressed destabilising element will be excluded from its symbolisation—without, however, ever disappearing. In this regard, a vignette from the history of nature conservation can be revealing. As is well known nature conservation was developed first in the United States; what is not so well known is that ‘a major feature of the crusade for resource conservation was a deliberate campaign to destroy wild animals—one of the most efficient, well-organized, and well-financed such efforts in all of man’s history’ (Worster, 1994:261). All this, although not solely attributable to it, was part of a ‘progressive’ moralistic ideology which conceived of nature together with society as harbouring ruthless exploiters and criminals who should be banished from the land (Worster, 1994:265). The driving force behind this enterprise was clearly a particular ethically distinctive construction of nature articulated within the framework of a conservation ideology. According to this construction what ‘was’ had to conform to what ‘should be’ and what ‘should be’, that is to say nature without vermin (coyotes and other wild predators), was accepted as more natural—more harmonious—than what ‘was’: ‘These conservationists were dedicated to reorganizing the natural economy in a way that would fulfil their own ideal vision of what nature should be like’ (Worster, 1994:266). This construction was accepted by the Roosevelt administration in the USA (1901-9) and led to the formation of an official programme to exterminate vermin. The job was given to a government agency, the Bureau of the Biological Survey (BBS) in the Department of Agriculture, and a ruthless war started (in 1907 alone, 1,700 wolves and 23,000 coyotes were killed in the National Parks and this policy continued and expanded for years) (Worster, 1994:263). What is this dialectic between the beatific fantasy of nature and the demonised vermin doing if not illustrating the Lacanian dialectic between the two sides of fantasy or between fantasy and symptom? Since we will explore the first of these two Lacanian approaches to fantasy in Chapter 4, we will concentrate here on the fantasy/symptom axis. 20 As far as the promise of filling the lack in the Other is concerned, fantasy can be better understood in its relation to the Lacanian conception of the symptom; according to one possible reading, fantasy and symptom are two inter-implicated terms. It is the symptom that interrupts the consistency of the field of our constructions of reality, of the object of identification, by embodying the repressed jouissance, the destabilising part of nature excluded from its harmonious symbolisation. The symptom here is a real kernel of enjoyment; it is the repressed jouissance that returns and does not ever ‘stop in imposing itself [on us]’ (Soler, 1991:214). If fantasy is ‘the support that gives consistency to what we call reality’ (Žižek, 1989:49) on the other hand reality is always a symptom (Žižek, 1992). Here we are insisting on the late Lacanian conception of the symptom as sinthome. In this conception, a signifier is married to jouissance, a signifier is instituted in the real, outside the signifying chain but at the same time internal to it. This paradoxical role of the symptom can help us understand the paradoxical role of fantasy. Fantasy gives discourse its consistency because it opposes the symptom (Ragland-Sullivan, 1991:16). Hence, if the symptom is an encounter with the real, with a traumatic point that resists symbolisation, and if the discursive has to arrest the real and repress jouissance in order to produce reality, then the negation of the real within fantasy can only be thought in terms of opposing, of stigmatising the symptom. This is then the relation between symptom and fantasy. The self-consistency of a symbolic construction of reality depends on the harmony instituted by fantasy. This fantasmatic harmony can only be sustained by the neutralisation of the symptom and of the real, by a negation of the generalised lack that crosses the field of the social. But how is this done? If social fantasy produces the self-consistency of a certain construction it can do so only by presenting the symptom as ‘an alien, disturbing intrusion, and not as the point of eruption of the otherwise hidden truth of the existing social order’ (Žižek, 1991a:40). The social fantasy of a harmonious social or natural order can only be sustained if all the persisting disorders can be attributed to an alien intruder. To return to our example, the illusory character of our harmonious construction of nature is shown in the fact that there is a part of the real which escapes its schema and assumes a symptomatic form (vermin, etc.); in order for this fantasy to remain coherent, this real symptom has to be stigmatised and eliminated. It cannot be accepted as the excluded truth of nature; such a recognition would lead to a dislocation of the fantasy in question. When, however, the dependence of fantasy on the symptom is revealed, then the play—the relation—between the symptom and fantasy reveals itself as another mode of the play between the real and the symbolic/imaginary nexus producing reality.

### Link – War

**Their desire to eliminate disorder is rooted in the push towards utopia**

**Stavrakakis 99** (Yannis, *Lacan and the Political,* Visiting Professor, Department of Government, University of Essex, pages 101-102).

In order to realise the problematic character of the utopian operation it is necessary to articulate a genealogy of this way of representing and making sense of the world. The work of Norman Cohn seems especially designed to serve this purpose. What is most important is that in Cohn’s schema we can encounter the three basic characteristics of utopian fantasies that we have already singled out: first, their link to instances of disorder, to the element of negativity. Since human experience is a continuous battle with the unexpected there is always a need to represent and master this unexpected, to transform disorder to order. Second, this representation is usually articulated as a total and universal representation, a promise of absolute mastery of the totality of the real, a vision of the end of history. A future utopian state is envisaged in which disorder will be totally eliminated. Third, this symbolisation produces its own remainder; there is always a certain particularity remaining outside the universal schema. It is to the existence of this evil agent, which can be easily localised, that all persisting disorder is attributed. The elimination of disorder depends then on the elimination of this group. The result is always horrible: persecution, massacres, holocausts. Needless to say, no utopian fantasy is ever realised as a result of all these ‘crimes’—as mentioned in Chapter 2, the purpose of fantasy is not to satisfy an (impossible) desire but to constitute it as such. What is of great interest for our approach is the way in which Cohn himself articulates a genealogy of the pair utopia/demonisation in his books The Pursuit of the Millennium and Europe’s Inner Demons (Cohn, 1993b, 1993c). The same applies to his book Warrant for Genocide (Cohn, 1996) which will also be implicated at a certain stage in our analysis.

These books are concerned with the same social phenomenon, the idea of purifying humanity through the extermination of some category of human beings which are conceived as agents of corruption, disorder and evil. The contexts are, of course, different, but the urge remains the same (Cohn, 1993b:xi). All these works then, at least according to my reading, are concerned with the production of an archenemy which goes together with the utopian mentality.

### Link – State

**Working through traditional political structures creates a constitutive lack and disappointment in utopia**

**Stavrakakis 99 (**Yannis, *Lacan and the Political,* Visiting Professor, Department of Government, University of Essex, pages 135-136).

Slavoj Zizek starts *Tarrying with the Negative* by presenting the most striking and sublime expression of a political attempt to encircle the lack of the real, to show the political within a space of political representation: the flag of the rebels in the violent overthrow of Ceausescu in Romania. In this flag, the red star, the communist symbol constituting the nodal point of the flag and of a whole political order, the ‘symbol standing for the organising principle of the national life’ is cut out; what remains in its place is only a hole. It is in this brief moment, after the collapse of an order and before the articulation of another one, that it becomes possible to attest to the visibility of the hole in the big Other, to sense the presence of the political. If there is a duty for critical intellectuals today it is to occupy all the time the space of this hole, especially when a new order (a new reoccupation of traditional politics) is stabilised and attempts to make invisible this lack in the Other (Žižek, 1993:1– 2). As far as political praxis is concerned our ethical duty can only be to attempt the institutionalisation of this lack within political reality. This duty is a truly and radically democratic one. It is also an ethical duty that marks the philosophical dimension of democracy. As Bernasconi and Critchley point out, if democracy is an ethically grounded form of political life which does not cease to call itself into question by asking of its legitimacy, if legitimate communities are those that call themselves into question, then these communities are philosophical (Critchley, 1992:239).

In this light, what becomes fundamental in democracy is that it makes visible the political institution, the limit of all political forces. By instituting antagonism it points to the distance between every utopian symbolisation and the real it attempts to master. But how exactly is this distance marked and made visible?

This visibility is only obtained in so far as opposite forms of institution (of the social) are possible, and this possibility is revealed when those forms are actually postulated and fought for in the historical arena. For it is only in their antagonistic relation to other projects that the contingency of particular acts of institution is shown, and it is this contingency that gives them their political character.

(Laclau, 1994:4)

In other words, the conditions for maintaining the visibility of the constitutive lack and the contingent nature of a structure are, according to Laclau’s schema, the following: first, to make visible the (external) conflict between the different political projects, the different contents that purport to fill this lack (none of which is pre-determined to perform this task); and second, to make visible the (internal) split marking each of these projects, a split between their function as representatives of (universal) fullness and their concrete (particular) content (Laclau, 1993:285). Democracy attempts to maintain this visibility, to institutionalise this lack by including ‘as a part of its “normal”, “regular” reproduction’ the moment of the suspension/ dissolution of political reality. This particular moment of the eruption of the real is, as Žižek points out, the moment of elections:

At the moment of elections, the whole hierarchic network of social relations is in a way suspended, put in parentheses; ‘society’ as an organic unity ceases to exist, it changes into a contingent collection of atomized individuals, of abstract units, and the result depends on a purely quantitative mechanism of counting, ultimately on a stochastic process: some wholly unforeseeable (or manipulated) event—a scandal which erupts a few days before an election, for example—can add that ‘half per cent’ one way or the other that determines the general orientation of the country’s politics over the next few years.... In vain do we conceal this thoroughly ‘irrational’ character of what we call ‘formal democracy’.... Only the acceptance of such a risk, only such a readiness to hand over one’s fate to ‘irrational’ hazard, renders ‘democracy’ possible.

(Žižek, 1989:147)

This suspension of sedimented political reality, this opening to the moment of the political, presupposes the institutionalisation both of the external antagonism between competing political forces and, most importantly, of the internal split marking the identity of all these forces (Žižek’s pure antagonism), since the repetition of the moment of elections inscribes deep in our political culture the recognition that none of these forces can sublate its internal split; if we need elections every once in a while it is because we accept that the hegemonic link between a concrete content and its incarnation of fullness has to be continuously re-established and renegotiated. This is one of the ways in which democracy identifies with the symptom (the constitutive antagonism of the social which is usually presented as a mere epiphenomenon) and traverses the fantasy of a harmonious social order: by instituting lack at the place of the principle of societal organisation.9

### Link – Hegemony

**Desire to create an empire with a unified political order is a utopian fantasy**

**Stavrakakis 99** (Yannis, *Lacan and the Political,* Visiting Professor, Department of Government, University of Essex, pages p 81-82 ).

The fantasmatic support If political reality is a symbolic construction produced through metaphoric and metonymic processes and articulated around points de capiton and empty signifiers, it nevertheless depends on fantasy in order to constitute itself. This dimension must have become evident from our argumentation so far. It is useful however to present one more example in which this dimension is illustrated with clarity.

Fantasies of mastery, especially mastery of knowledge, have direct political significance. Thomas Richards, in his book The Imperial Archive: Knowledge and the Fantasy of the Empire, explores the importance of fantasy in the construction of the British empire. There is no doubt that no nation can close its hand around the whole of the world. In that sense an empire is always, at least partly, a fiction. Absolute political control is impossible due to a variety of reasons, such as the lack of information and control in distant parts of the imperial territory. This gap in knowledge (in the symbolic constitution of the empire) and control, was covered over by the fantasy construction of the imperial archive, ‘a fantasy of knowledge collected and united in the service of state and empire’. In that sense ‘the myth of imperial archive brought together in fantasy what was breaking apart in fact’ and was thus shared widely; it even had an impact in policymaking (Richards, 1993:6). This imperial archive was not a real museum or a real library, it was not a building or a collection of texts, but a fantasy of projected total knowledge: it constituted a ‘collectively imagined junction of all that was known or knowable, a fantastic representation of an epistemological master pattern, a virtual focal point for the heterogeneous local knowledge of metropolis and empire’ (Richards, 1993:11). In this utopian space, disorder was transformed to order, heterogeneity to homogeneity and lack of political control and information to an imaginary empire of knowledge and power.

Such a fantasmatic support is, however, discernible in all the examples we have already presented. This is because all ideological formations, all constructions of political reality, although not in the same degree or in the same way, aspire to eliminate anxiety and loss, to defeat dislocation, in order to achieve a state of fullness. Thus ‘what Thatcherism as an ideology does, is to address the fears, the anxieties, the lost identities, of a people.... It is addressed to our collective fantasies, to Britain as an imagined community, to the social imaginary’ (Hall, 1988:167). The same applies to nationalism, to millenarian redemption, as well as to Disraeli’s ‘One Nation’ and to Blairism. This fantasmatic element is crucial for the desirability of all these discourses, in other words for their hegemonic appeal. All political projects to reconstitute society as a well-ordered and harmonious ensemble aim at this impossible object which reduces utopia to a fantasmatic screen. If, according to Laclau’s Lacanian dictum, ‘society does not exist’ (as a harmonious ensemble), this impossible existence is all the time constructed and reconstructed through the symbolic production of discourse and its fantasmatic investment, through the reduction of the political to politics.

### Link – Criticism

**The 1ac is a fantasy that we can remove oppression merely by criticizing a small part of it**

**Zizek 97** (Slavoj, International Director of the Birkbeck Institute for the Humanities, president of the Society for Theoretical Psychoanalysis, The Plague of Fantasies, p. 45-48)

Inshort, the right-wing intellectual is a knave, a conformist who refers to the mere existence of the given order as an argument for it, and mocks the Left on account of its `utopian' plans, which necessarily lead to catastrophe; while the left-wing intellectual is a fool, a court jester who publicly displays the lie of the existing order, but in a way which suspends the performative efficiency of his speech. Today, after the fall of Social­ism, the knave is a neoconservative advocate of the free market who cruelly rejects all forms of social solidarity as counterproductive sentimen­talism, while the fool is a deconstructionist cultural critic who, by means of his ludic procedures destined to `subvert' the existing order, actually serves as its supplement.`' What psychoanalysis can do to help us to break this vicious cycle of fool-knave is to lay bare its underlying libidinal economy - the libidinal profit, the 'surplus-enjoyment', which sustains each of the two positions…{*original upon request*}… So: if the conservative knave is not unlike the gypsy, since he also, in his answer to a concrete complaint (Why are things so horrible for us ... /gays, blacks, women/?'), sings his tragic song of eternal fate ('Why are things so bad for us people, 0 why?') - that is, he also, as it were, changes the tonality of the question from concrete complaint to abstract acceptance of the enigma of Fate - the satisfaction of the progressive fool, a `social critic', is of the same kind as that of the poor Russian peasant, the typical hysterical satisfaction of snatching a little piece of *jouissance* away from the Master. If the victim in the first joke were a fool, he would allow the monkey to wash his balls in the whisky yet another time, but would add some dirt or sticky stuff to his glass beforehand, so that after the monkey's departure he would be able to claim triumphantly: 'I duped him! His balls are now even dirtier than before!' It is easy to imagine a much more sublime version of the reversal performed by the gypsy musician - is not this same reversal at work in the subjective position of castrati singers, for example? They are made to `cry :o Heaven': after suffering a horrible mutilation, they are not supposed .o bemoan their worldly misfortune and pain, and to look for the culprits responsible for it, but instead to address their complaint to Heaven itself. In a way, they must accomplish a kind of magic reversal and *exchange* all their worldly complaints for a complaint addressed to Divine Fate itself - this reversal allows them to enjoy their terrestrial life to the fullest. This is (the singing) *voice* at its most elementary: the embodiment of 'surplus ­enjoyment' in the precise sense of the paradoxical `pleasure in pain'. That is to say: when Lacan uses the term *plus-de jouir,* one has to ask a naive but crucial question: in what does this surplus consist? Is it merely a qualitative increase of ordinary pleasure? The ambiguity of the French term is decisive here: it can mean `surplus of enjoyment' as well as `no more enjoyment' - the surplus of enjoyment over mere pleasure is generated by the presence of the very opposite of pleasure, that is, pain. Pain generates surplus-enjoyment via the magic reversal-into-itself by means of which the very material texture of our expression of pain (the crying voice) gives rise to enjoyment - and is not this what takes place towards the end of the joke about the monkey washing his balls in my whisky, when the gypsy transforms my furious complaint into a self­satisfying melody? What we find here is a neat exemplification of the Lacanian formula of the fetishistic object (minus phi under small a): like the castrato's voice, the *objet petit a -* the surplus-enjoyment - arises at the very place of castration. And does not the same go for love poetry and its ultimate topic: the lamentation of. the poet who has lost his beloved (because she doesn't return his love, because she has died, because her parents do not approve of their union, and block his access to her ...)? Poetry, the specific poetic *jouissance,* emerges when *the very symbolic articulation of this Loss gives rise to a pleasure of its own.'* Do we not find the same elementary ideological gesture inscribed into Jewish identity? Jews `evacuate the Law of *jouissance',* they are `the people of the Book' who stick to the rules and allow for no ecstatic experience of the Sacred; yet, at the same time, they do find an excessive enjoyment precisely in their dealings with the Text of the Book: the `Talmudic' enjoyment of how to read it properly, how to interpret it so that we can none the less have it our own way. Is not the tradition of lively debates and disputes which strike foreigners (Gentiles) as meaningless hairsplitting a neat example of how the very renunciation of the Thing *jouissance* pro­duces its own *jouissance* (in interpreting the text)? Maybe Kafka himself, as the Western `Protestant' Jew, was shocked to discover this obscene aspect of the Jewish Law' - is not this *jouis-sense* in the Letter clearly discernible in the discussion between the priest and K at the end of *The Trial,* after the parable on the door of the Law? What strikes one here is the `senseless' detailed hairsplitting which, in precise contrast to the Western tradition of metaphorical-gnostic reading, undermines the obvious meaning not by endeavouring to discern beneath it layers of `deeper' analogical meanings, but by insisting on a too-close, too-literal reading ('the man from the country was never ordered to come there in the first place', etc.). Each of the two positions, that of fool and that of knave, is thus sustained by its own kind of *jouissance:* the enjoyment of snatching back from the Master part of the *jouissance* he stole from us (in the case of the fool); the enjoyment which directly pertains to the subject's pain (in the case of the knave). What psychoanalysis can do to help the critique of ideology is precisely to clarify the status of this paradoxical *jouissance* as the payment that the exploited, the servant, receives for serving the Master. This *jouissance,* of course, always emerges within a certain phan­tasmic field; the crucial precondition for breaking the chains of servitude is thus to `traverse the fantasy' which structures our *jouissance* in a way which keeps us attached to the Master - **makes us accept the framework of the social relationship of domination.**

### Link – Suffering

**The politics of suffering is based in victimization – destroys**

**Zizek 1** (Slavoj, Interview with Christopher Hanlon, Ph.D. from UMass-Amherst, “Psychoanalysis and the Post-Political: An Interview with Slavoj Žižek,” New Literary History, 32.1, 1-21, Project Muse).

SZ+: Well, I don’t think that . . . OK, Cornel West did say that. But I nonetheless don’t think that he perceives us as the main opponent. Because this very reproach that you mention is not a reproach that can be addressed specifically to Lacan. My idea is the old marxist idea that this immediate reference to experience, practice, struggle, etcetera, usually relies on the most abstract and pure theory, and as an old philosopher I would say, as you said before, that we simply cannot escape theory. I fanatically oppose this turn which has taken place in social theory, this idea that there is no longer time for great theoretical projects, that all we can do is narrativize the experience of our suffering, that all various ethnic or sexual groups can ultimately do is to narrate their painful, traumatic experience. I think this is a catastrophe. I think that this fits perfectly the existing capitalist order, that there is nothing subversive in it. I think that this fits perfectly today’s ideology of victimization, where in order to legitimize, to gain power politically, you must present yourself, somehow, as the victim.

### Link – Demands on the State

Demands on the state are utopian – they will never be met and allow the privileged to solidify their place in the social order

Zizek 2 (Slavoj, International Director of the Birkbeck Institute for the Humanities, president of the Society for Theoretical Psychoanalysis, Welcome to the Desert of the Real: Five Essays on September 11 and Related Dates, “Passions of the Real, Passions of Semblance”, p. 59-61) MH

In a strict Lacanian sense of the term, we should thus posit that 'happiness' relies on the subject's inability or unreadiness fully to confront the consequences of its desire: the price of happiness is that the subject remains stuck in the inconsistency of its desire. In our daily lives, we (pretend to) desire things which we do not really desire, so that, ultimately, the worst thing that can happen is for us to get what we 'officially' desire. Happiness is thus inherently hypocritical: it is the happiness of dreaming about things we do not really want. When today's Left bombards the capitalist system with demands that it obviously cannot fulfil (Full employment! Retain the welfare state! Full rights for immigrants!), it is basically playing a game of hysterical provocation, of addressing the Master with a demand which will be impossible for him to meet, and will thus expose his impotence. The problem with this strategy, however, is not only that the system cannot meet these demands, but that, in addition, those who voice them do not really want them to be realized. For example when, 'radical' academics demand full rights for immigrants and opening of the borders, are they aware that the direct implementation of this demand would, for obvious reasons, inundate developed Western countries with millions of newcomers, thus provoking a violent working-class racist backlash which would then endanger the privileged position ofthese very academics? Of course they are, but they count on the fact that their demand will not be met - in this way, they can hypocritically retain their clear radical conscience while continuing to enjoy their privileged position. In 1994, when a new wave of emigration from Cuba to the USA was on the cards, Fidel Castro warned the USA that if they did not stop inciting Cubans to emigrate, Cuba would no longer prevent them from doing it - which the Cuban authorities in effect did a couple of days later, embarrassing the USA with thousands of unwanted newcomers.... Is this not like the proverbial woman who snapped back at a man who was making macho advances to her: 'Shut up, or you'll have to do what you're boasting about!' In both cases, the gesture is that of calling the other's bluff, counting on the fact that what the other really fears is that one will fully comply with his or her demand. And would not the same gesture also throw our radical academics into a panic? Here the old '68 motto 'Soy0ns realistes, demandons l'impossible!' acquires a new cynical and sinister meaning which, perhaps, reveals its truth: 'Let's be realists: we, the academic Left, want to appear critical, while fully enjoying the privileges the system offers us. So let's bombard the system with impossible demands: we all know that these demands won't be met, so we can be sure that nothing will actually change, and we'll maintain our privileged status!' If someone accuses a big corporation of particular financial crimes, he or she is exposed to risks which can go right up to murder attempts; if he or she asks the same corporation to finance a research project into the link between global capitalism and the emergence of hybrid postcolonial identities, he or she stands a good chance of getting hundreds ofthousands of dollars.

### Link – Universal \*\*\*

Yo this is really good for the disabilities aff – like on point shit right here

**Universalizing the struggle of one individual group is an impossible, utopian demand**

**Zizek 99** (Slavoj, The Ticklish Subject, p.229-230, plus footnote 54)

**The pathetic assertion `We are all [Jews, Blacks, gays**, residents of Sarajevo ...]' **can thus work in an extremely ambiguous way: it can *also* induce a hasty claim that our own predicament is in fact the same as that of the true victims, that is, a false metaphoric universalization of the fate of the excluded**. Soon after the publication of Solzhenitsyn's *Gulag* trilogy in the West, it became fashionable in some `radical' leftist circles to emphasize how `our entire consumerist Western society is also one gigantic *Gulag,* in which we are imprisoned by the chains of the ruling ideology - and our position is even worse, since we are unaware of our true predicament'. In a recent discussion about clitoridectomy, a `radical' feminist pathetically claimed that Western women are in a way also thoroughly circumcised, having to undergo stressful diets, rigorous body training and painful breast- or face­lifting operations in order to remain attractive to men.... Although, of course, there is in both cases, an element of truth in the claims made, there is none the less something fundamentally faked in the pathetic statement of a radical upper-middle-class student that `the Berkeley cam­pus is also a gigantic *Gulag.* Is it not deeply significant that the best­known example of such a pathetic identification with the outcast/victim is J.F. Kennedy's 'Ich bin ein Berliner' from 1963 - a statement which is definitely not what Ranciere had in mind (and, incidentally, a statement which, because of a grammatical error, means, when retranslated into English, `I am a doughnut')? The way out of this predicament seems easy enough: the measure of the authenticity of the pathetic identification lies in its sociopolitical efficiency. To what effective measures does it amount? In short, how does this political stance of *singulier universel* affect what Ranciere calls the *police* structure? Is there a legitimate distinction between two `polices (orders of being)': the one which is (or tends to be) self-contained, and the one which is more open to the incorporation of properly political demands: Is there something like a `police of politics'? Of course, the Kantian answer (shared even by Badiou) would be that any direct identification of police (the Order of Being) with politics (the Truth-Event), any pro­cedure by means of which the Truth posits itself directly as the constitutive structuring principle of the sociopolitical Order of Being, leads to its opposite, to the `politics of the police', to revolutionary Terror, whose exemplary case is the Stalinist *desastre.* The problem is that the moment we try to provide the pathetic identification with the symptom, the assertion of the *universel singulier,* with a determinate content (What do protesters who pathetically claim `We are all immigrant workers!' actually *want?* What is their *demand* to the Police Power?), the old contrast between the radical universalism of *egaliberte* and the `postmodern' assertion of particular identities reappears with a vengeance, as is clear from the deadlock of gay politics, which fears losing its specificity when gays are acknowledged by the public discourse: do you want *equal rights* or *specific rights* to safeguard your particular way of life? The answer, of course, is that **the pathetic gesture of singulier universel effectively functions as a hysterical gesture made to avoid the decision by postponing its satisfaction indefinitely**. That is to say: the gesture of singulier universel flourishes on bombarding the Police/Power edifice with impossible demands, with demands which are `made to be rejected'; its logic is that of `In demand­ing that you do this, I am actually demanding that you do not do it, because that's not it.' The situation here is properly undecidable: not only is a radical political project often `betrayed' by a compromise with the Police Order (the eternal complaint of revolutionary radicals: once the reformists take over, they change only the form and accommodate them­selves to the old masters), there can also be the opposite case of pseudo­radicalization, which fits the existing power relations much better than a modest reformist proposal.54 **Footnote 54:** 54. Therein lies the grain of truth of Richard Rorty's recent polemics against `radical' cultural studies elitists (see Richard Rorty, Achieving Our America, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1998): **under the pretence of radically questioning the mythical spectre of Power, they perfectly fit the reproduction of the existing power relations**, posing no threat to them whatsoever - or, to paraphrase Walter Benjamin's thesis, their declared attitude of radical opposition *to* the existing social relations coexists with their perfect functioning *within* these relations, rather like the proverbial hysteric who perfectly fits the network of exploita­tion against which he complains, and effectively endorses its reproduction.

### Link – Securitization/Fear

**Creating enemies as the other is a psychological construct that creates an unconscious need for lashouts**

**Byles 3**, (Professor English, University of Cyprus) **(**Joanna Montgomery, *Journal for the Psychoanalysis of Culture and Society* 8.2 (2003) 208-213, Psychoanalysis and War: The Superego and Projective Identification).

It is here of course that language plays an important role in imagining the other, the other within the self, and the other as self, as well as the enormously influential visual images each group can have of the other. In the need to emphasize similarity in difference, both verbal and visual metaphor can play a meaningful role in creating a climate for peaceful understanding, and this is where literature, especially the social world of the drama and of film, but also the more private world of poetry, can be immensely significant. Of course not all literature is equally transparent.

In conclusion, war, in all its manifestations, is a phenomenon put into action by individuals who have been politicized as a group to give and receive violent death, to appropriate the enemy's land, homes, women, children, and goods, and perhaps to lose their own. As we have seen, in wartime the splitting of the self and other into friend and enemy enormously relieves the normal psychic tension caused by human ambivalence when love and hate find two separate objects of attention. Hence the .soldier's and terrorist's willingness to sacrifice her/his life for "a just cause," which may be a Nation, a Group, or a Leader with whom he has close emotional ties and identity. I n this way s/he does not feel guilty: the destructive impulses, mobilised by her/his own superego, together with that of the social superego, have projected the guilt s/he might feel at killing strangers onto the enemy. In other words, the charging of the enemy with guilt by which the superego of the State mobilizes the individual's superego seems to be of fundamental importance in escaping the sense of guilt which war provokes in those engaged in the killing; yet the mobilization of superego activities can still involve the individual's self-punitive mechanisms, even though most of his/her guilt has been projected onto the enemy in the name of his own civilization and culture. As we all know, this guilt can become a problem at the end of a war, leading to varying degrees of misery and mental illness. For some, the killing of an enemy and a stranger cannot be truly mourned, and there remains a blank space, an irretrievable act or event to be lived through over and over again. This dilemma is poignantly expressed in Wilfred Owen's World War One poem "Strange Meeting" the final lines of which read as follows: I am the enemy you killed, my friend. I knew you in this dark: for so you frowned Yesterday through me as you jabbed and killed. I parried; but my hands were loath and cold. Let us sleep now. ... (Owen 126) The problem for us today is how to create the psychological climate of opinion, a mentality, that will reject war, genocide, and terrorism as viable solutions to internal and external situations of conflict; to recognize our projections for what they are: dangerously irresponsible psychic acts based on superego hatred and violence. We must challenge the way in which the State superego can manipulate our responses in its own interests, even take away our subjectivities. We should acknowledge and learn to displace the vio lence in ourselves in socially harmless ways, getting rid of our fears and anxieties of the other and of difference by relating and identifying with the other and thus creating the serious desire to live together in a peaceful world. What seems to be needed is for the superego to regain its developmental role of mitigating omniscient protective identification by ensuring an intact, integrated object world, a world that will be able to contain unconscious fears, hatred, and anxieties without the need for splitting and projection. As Bion has pointed out, omnipotence replaces thinking and omniscience replaces learning. We must learn to link our internal and external worlds so as to act as a container of the other's fears and anxieties, and thus in turn to encourage the other to reciprocate as a container of our hatreds and fears.

If war represents cultural formations that in turn represent objectifications of the psyche via the super-ego of the individual and of the State, then perhaps we can reformulate these psychic social mechanisms of projection and superego aggression. Here, that old peace-time ego and the reparative component of the individual and State superego will have to play a large part. The greater the clash of cultural formations for example, Western Modernism and Islamic Fundamentalism the more urgent the need. "The knowledge now most worth having" is an authentic way of internalizing what it is we understand about war and international terrorism that will liberate us from the history of our collective traumatic past and the imperatives it has imposed on us. The inner psychic world of the individual has an enormously important adaptive role to play here in developing mechanisms of protective identification not as a means of damaging and destroying the other, but as a means of empathy, of containing the other, and in turn being contained. These changes may be evolutionary rather than revolutionary, gradual ratherthan speedy. Peace and dare I say it contentment are not just an absence of war, but a state of mind.

Furthermore, we should learn not to project too much into our group, and our nation, for this allows the group to tyrannize us, so that we follow like lost sheep. But speaking our minds takes courage because groups do not like open dissenters. These radical psychic changes may be evolutionary rather than revolutionary, gradual rather than speedy; however, my proposition that understanding the other so that we can reduce her/his motivation to kill requires urgent action. Peace is not just an absence of war, but a state of mind and, most importantly, a way of thinking.

**Fear of the other is a form of collective psychosis which endangers everyone.**

**Gleisner 83** (John, consultant psychiatrist at the North Western Regional Health Authority in Greater Manchester, new internationalist 121, March, <http://www.newint.org/issue121/enemy.htm>l).

Many were shocked to hear British people chant ‘nuke the Argies’ and to see how the Ministry of Defense and the media portrayed Argentina as a nation of international gangsters. It was a shock, but it should not have been. After all, governments and media throughout the world have perfected a psychological war machine which is highly efficient in fostering fear and hatred of ‘the enemy’. True, for us in the West the enemy these days is usually portrayed as toting a red flag and a fistful of nuclear missiles, but the fear and hatred are free-floating and can be attached, by skilful manoeuvering, to any object. Softened by centuries of insecurity, our minds are malleable clay for the psychological war machine. There have often been good grounds in the past for fearing the enemy, and the distinction between ‘them’ and ‘us’ was once necessary for survival. But nuclear weapons have changed everything. Today that ancient them us distinction threatens the survival of them *and* us. As Einstein once said: ‘The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything except our way of thinking. . . we need an essentially new way of thinking if mankind is to survive.’ The old them-us thinking is dangerous because it leads us to accept the unacceptable. And the reasoning goes something like this: ‘The Russians are basically different from us. They are wicked bullies who intend to take over the world. We can stop them only by threatening them because bullies only respond to threats. And because they are basically different from us it is alright to destroy them if necessary. Nuclear weapons are terrible but it may be that the Russians cannot be stopped by any other means. Although nuclear war would be horrible, we have a reasonable chance of surviving. And anyway life under Russian rule would be far worse than death.’ If any individual spoke about another using logic like this they would be diagnosed as paranoid. And, indeed, them-us thinking is a time-honored symptom of psychosis (a psychotic being someone who can no longer distinguish between events in the world and events taking place in their imagination), characterised by what psychologists call ‘denial’ and ‘projection’. ‘Denial’ is refusing to acknowledge one’s own unpleasant motives. ‘Projection’ is attaching these unacknowledged motives onto someone else and then rejecting them. It is the perfect way of having your cake and eating it too: of indulging your own bad motives and criticising them at the same time. Our media and governments depict the Russians as aggressive expansionists bent on our destruction. A powerful perception of threat is created to soften up the public for yet more ‘defence’ spending, And in the Soviet Union precisely the same tricks are used to persuade Soviet citizens to make the necessary ‘sacrifices’ for protection against us. Most of us have never met a Russian. Yet there are few of us without opinions about how dangerous they are. We tend to see our own country as conciliatory, just, trustworthy, rational, legitimate. Theirs is aggressive, unjust, untrustworthy, irrational and illegitimate. Yet anyone travelling in the Soviet Union is soon struck not only by the Soviets’ strong belief in their own peacefulness, but also by their surprise and puzzlement at the fact that foreigners do not view them in the same light. They fear us — for precisely the same reasons that we fear them.

### Link – Ethics

**Universal ethical principles are utopian**

**Stavrakakis 99** (Yannis, *Lacan and the Political,* Visiting Professor, Department of Government, University of Essex, pages 127-129 ).

In the first place Lacan’s suggestion that the *status* of the Freudian conception of the unconscious is ethical (XI:33) and that Freud’s initial central intuition is ethical in kind might seem strange. However, his seminar of 1959–60 devoted to *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis* proves the importance he attributed to the question of ethics. Moreover, he was to return again and again to the problematic of the *Ethics* seminar, starting from the seminar of the following year *(Transference)* up to *Encore* (1972–3) which starts with a reference to the seminar on *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis.* In fact, it is in *Encore* where Lacan states that his *Ethics* seminar was the only one he wanted to rewrite and publish as a written text (XX:53)—for someone accused of logocentrism this is a very important statement. However, it is not the place here to embark on an analysis or even a presentation of Lacan’s seminar; instead I will use some of the insights developed there as a starting point in order to articulate an ethical position relevant to the discussion on democracy articulated in the previous section of this chapter.

Psychoanalytic ethics is clearly not an ethics of the ideal or the good as is the case with traditional ethics. The ideal, as master signifier, belongs to the field of the ideological or even the utopian: ‘A sensitive subject such as ethics is not nowadays separable from what is called ideology’ (VII:182). For Lacan, the ‘ethics of the good’ or the ideal is no more a real philosophical possibility (Rajchman, 1991:46). This is clearly shown in his seminar on *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis* where the good is definitely the most important issue in question. But Lacan makes clear from the beginning that he is going to speak about the good from a bizarre point of view: ‘I will speak then about the *good,* and perhaps what I have to say will be *bad* in the sense that I don’t have all the goodness required to speak well of it’ (VII:218, my emphasis). In Lacan’s view, ‘the good as such—something that has been the eternal object of the philosopher’s quest in the sphere of ethics, the philosopher’s stone of all the moralities’ is radically denied by Freud (VII:96). This is because ‘the Sovereign good, which is *das Ding,* which is the mother, is also the object of incest, is a forbidden good, and [because]...there is no other good. Such is the foundation of the moral law as turned on its head by Freud’ (VII:70). Generalising from his analysis one can argue that almost the whole of the history of Western philosophy and ethical thought is an unending but always doomed quest for harmony based on successive conceptions of the good: I have emphasized this since the beginning of the year: from the origin of moral philosophy, from the moment when the term ethics acquired the meaning of man’s reflection on his condition and calculation of the proper paths to follow, all mediation on man’s good has taken place as a function of the index of pleasure. And I mean all, since Plato, certainly since Aristotle, and down through the Stoics, the Epicureans, and even through Christian thought itself in St Thomas Aquinas. As far as the determination of different goods is concerned, things have clearly developed along the paths of an essentially hedonist problematic. It is only too evident that all that has involved the greatest of difficulties, and that these difficulties are those of experience. And in order to resolve them, all the philosophers have been led to discern not true pleasures from false, for such a distinction is impossible to make, but the true and false goods that pleasure points to.

(VII:221)

This is also the case with the majority of ethical standpoints in everyday life. The clear aim of all these attempts is to reinstate the big Other, the symbolic system, the field of social construction, as a harmonious unified whole by referring it to a single positive principle; the same applies to the subject— maybe primarily to the subject which, according to traditional ethics, can be harmonised by being subjected to the ethical law. It is evident that an ethical view based on the fantasy of harmony applied both to the subject and to the social is not compatible with democracy, rather it can only reinforce ‘totalitarianism’ or ‘fragmentation’. Instead of a harmonious society democracy recognises a social field inherently divided; in a sense it is founded on the recognition of the lack in the Other. Instead of harmonising subjectivities democracy recognises the division of the citizens’ identities and the fluidity of their political persuasions. In fact it points to the lack in the subject, to a conception of subjectivity which is not unified by reference to a single positive principle. Thus the intervention of psychoanalysis in the field of this antithesis between traditional ethics and democracy is of the utmost importance.

In the course of history the search for the proper ideal, for the ‘real’ good, has led to numerous distinctions between true and false goods. This enterprise of ethical thought aims at the fantasmatic reduction of all impossibility, at the elimination of the intervention of *t???* in human life. A certain idea of the good is instituted at the place of the constitutive aporia of the human life. But this is a dead end; the successive failures of all these attempts not only put into question the particular ideas of the good that have been dislocated but this whole strategy:

the question of the Sovereign Good is one that man has asked himself since time immemorial, but the analyst knows that that is a question that is closed. Not only doesn’t he have that Sovereign Good that is asked of him, but he also knows there isn’t any.

### Link – Environment

reunderline

Stavrakakis 99 (Yannis, Visiting Professor, Department of Government, University of Essex, Lacan and the Political, “The Lacanian Object” p.63-5)

Mac Arthur, Odum and Clements, like Isaac Newton, ‘had tried to make nature into a single, coherent picture where all the pieces fitted firmly together’. All of them tried to reduce the disorderliness or the unknown qualities of nature to a single all-encompassing metaphysical idea (Worster, 1994:400). Even conceptions of nature stressing the element of conflict, such as the Darwinian one, sometimes feel the need to subject this non-perfect image to some discernible goal of nature (for example the ‘constantly increasing diversity of organic types in one area’—Worster, 1994:161) which introduces a certain harmony through the back door. What constantly emerges from this exposition is that when harmony is not present it has to be somehow introduced in order for our reality to be coherent. It has to be introduced through a fantasmatic social construction. 19 One should not get the impression though that this is a mere philosophical discussion. In so far as our constructions of reality influence our behaviour—and this is what they basically do—our fixation on harmony has direct social and political consequences. Reality construction does not take place on a superstructural level. Reality is forced to conform to our constructions of it not only at the spiritual or the intellectual, but also at the material level. But why does it have to be forced to conform? This is due, for instance, to the gap between our harmonious fantasmatic constructions of nature and nature itself, between reality and the real. Our constructions of reality are so strong that nature has to conform to them and not they to nature; reality is conceived as mastering the real. But there is always a certain leftover, a disturbing element destabilising our constructions of nature. This has to be stigmatised, made into a scapegoat and exterminated. The more beatific and harmonious is a social fantasy the more this repressed destabilising element will be excluded from its symbolisation—without, however, ever disappearing. In this regard, a vignette from the history of nature conservation can be revealing. As is well known nature conservation was developed first in the United States; what is not so well known is that ‘a major feature of the crusade for resource conservation was a deliberate campaign to destroy wild animals—one of the most efficient, well-organized, and well-financed such efforts in all of man’s history’ (Worster, 1994:261). All this, although not solely attributable to it, was part of a ‘progressive’ moralistic ideology which conceived of nature together with society as harbouring ruthless exploiters and criminals who should be banished from the land (Worster, 1994:265). The driving force behind this enterprise was clearly a particular ethically distinctive construction of nature articulated within the framework of a conservation ideology. According to this construction what ‘was’ had to conform to what ‘should be’ and what ‘should be’, that is to say nature without vermin (coyotes and other wild predators), was accepted as more natural—more harmonious—than what ‘was’: ‘These conservationists were dedicated to reorganizing the natural economy in a way that would fulfil their own ideal vision of what nature should be like’ (Worster, 1994:266). This construction was accepted by the Roosevelt administration in the USA (1901-9) and led to the formation of an official programme to exterminate vermin. The job was given to a government agency, the Bureau of the Biological Survey (BBS) in the Department of Agriculture, and a ruthless war started (in 1907 alone, 1,700 wolves and 23,000 coyotes were killed in the National Parks and this policy continued and expanded for years) (Worster, 1994:263). What is this dialectic between the beatific fantasy of nature and the demonised vermin doing if not illustrating the Lacanian dialectic between the two sides of fantasy or between fantasy and symptom? Since we will explore the first of these two Lacanian approaches to fantasy in Chapter 4, we will concentrate here on the fantasy/symptom axis. 20 As far as the promise of filling the lack in the Other is concerned, fantasy can be better understood in its relation to the Lacanian conception of the symptom; according to one possible reading, fantasy and symptom are two inter-implicated terms. It is the symptom that interrupts the consistency of the field of our constructions of reality, of the object of identification, by embodying the repressed jouissance, the destabilising part of nature excluded from its harmonious symbolisation. The symptom here is a real kernel of enjoyment; it is the repressed jouissance that returns and does not ever ‘stop in imposing itself [on us]’ (Soler, 1991:214). If fantasy is ‘the support that gives consistency to what we call reality’ (Žižek, 1989:49) on the other hand reality is always a symptom (Žižek, 1992). Here we are insisting on the late Lacanian conception of the symptom as sinthome. In this conception, a signifier is married to jouissance, a signifier is instituted in the real, outside the signifying chain but at the same time internal to it. This paradoxical role of the symptom can help us understand the paradoxical role of fantasy. Fantasy gives discourse its consistency because it opposes the symptom (Ragland-Sullivan, 1991:16). Hence, if the symptom is an encounter with the real, with a traumatic point that resists symbolisation, and if the discursive has to arrest the real and repress jouissance in order to produce reality, then the negation of the real within fantasy can only be thought in terms of opposing, of stigmatising the symptom. This is then the relation between symptom and fantasy. The self-consistency of a symbolic construction of reality depends on the harmony instituted by fantasy. This fantasmatic harmony can only be sustained by the neutralisation of the symptom and of the real, by a negation of the generalised lack that crosses the field of the social. But how is this done? If social fantasy produces the self-consistency of a certain construction it can do so only by presenting the symptom as ‘an alien, disturbing intrusion, and not as the point of eruption of the otherwise hidden truth of the existing social order’ (Žižek, 1991a:40). The social fantasy of a harmonious social or natural order can only be sustained if all the persisting disorders can be attributed to an alien intruder. To return to our example, the illusory character of our harmonious construction of nature is shown in the fact that there is a part of the real which escapes its schema and assumes a symptomatic form (vermin, etc.); in order for this fantasy to remain coherent, this real symptom has to be stigmatised and eliminated. It cannot be accepted as the excluded truth of nature; such a recognition would lead to a dislocation of the fantasy in question. When, however, the dependence of fantasy on the symptom is revealed, then the play—the relation—between the symptom and fantasy reveals itself as another mode of the play between the real and the symbolic/imaginary nexus producing reality.

### Impact – Turns Case (K Affs)

**Kritik turns case – failure of utopian vision guarantees worse exclusion**

**Stavrakakis 99** (Yannis, *Lacan and the Political,* Visiting Professor, Department of Government, University of Essex, pages 100-101).

In order to answer these questions it is crucial to enumerate the conditions of possibility and the basic characteristics of utopian thinking. First of all it seems that the need for utopian meaning arises in periods of increased uncertainty, social instability and conflict, when the element of the political subverts the fantasmatic stability of our political reality. Utopias are generated by the surfacing of grave antagonisms and dislocations in the social field. As Tillich has put it ‘all utopias strive to negate the negative...in human existence; it is the negative in that existence which makes the idea of utopia necessary’ (Tillich in Levitas, 1990:103). Utopia then is one of the possible responses to the ever-present negativity, to the real antagonism which is constitutive of human experience. Furthermore, from the time of More’s *Utopia* (1516) it is conceived as an answer to the negativity inherent in concrete political antagonism. What is, however, the exact nature of this response? Utopias are images of future human communities in which these antagonisms and the dislocations fuelling them (the element of the political) will be forever resolved, leading to a reconciled and harmonious world—it is not a coincidence that, among others, Fourier names his utopian community ‘Harmony’ and that the name of the Owenite utopian community in the New World was ‘New Harmony’. As Marin has put it, utopia sets in view an imaginary resolution to social contradiction; it is a simulacrum of synthesis which dissimulates social antagonism by projecting it onto a screen representing a harmonious and immobile equilibrium (Marin, 1984:61). This final resolution is the essence of the utopian promise.

What I will try to do in this chapter is, first of all, to demonstrate the deeply problematic nature of utopian politics. Simply put, my argument will be that every utopian fantasy construction needs a ‘scapegoat’ in order to constitute itself—the Nazi utopian fantasy and the production of the ‘Jew’ is a good example, especially as pointed out in Zizek’s analysis.4 Every utopian fantasy produces its reverse and calls for its elimination. Put another way, the beatific side of fantasy is coupled in utopian constructions with a horrific side, a paranoid need for a stigmatised scapegoat. The naivety—and also the danger—of utopian structures is revealed when the realisation of this fantasy is attempted. It is then that we are brought close to the frightening kernel of the real: stigmatisation is followed by extermination. This is not an accident. It is inscribed in the structure of utopian constructions; it seems to be the way all fantasy constructions work. If in almost all utopian visions, violence and antagonism are eliminated, if utopia is based on the expulsion and repression of violence (this is its beatific side) this is only because it owes its own creation to violence; it is sustained and fed by violence (this is its horrific side). This repressed moment of violence resurfaces, as Marin points out, in the difference inscribed in the name utopia itself (Marin, 1984:110). What we shall argue is that it also resurfaces in the production of the figure of an enemy. To use a phrase enunciated by the utopianist Fourier, what is ‘driven out through the door comes back through the window’ (is not this a ‘precursor’ of Lacan’s *dictum* that ‘what is foreclosed in the symbolic reappears in the real’?—VII:131).5 The work of Norman Cohn and other historians permits the articulation of a genealogy of this manichean, equivalential way of understanding the world, from the great witch-hunt up to modern anti-Semitism, and Lacanian theory can provide valuable insights into any attempt to understand the logic behind this utopian operation—here the approach to fantasy developed in Chapter 2 will further demonstrate its potential in analysing our political experience. In fact, from the time of his unpublished seminar on *The Formations of the Unconscious,* Lacan identified the utopian dream of a perfectly functioning society as a highly problematic area (seminar of 18 June 1958).

### Impact – War

**Enemies and aggression stems from an unconscious suppression of fear and desire**

**Byles 3** (Joanna Montgomery, Professor English, University of Cyprus *Journal for the Psychoanalysis of Culture and Society* 8.2 (2003) 208-213, Psychoanalysis and War: The Superego and Projective Identification).

Of course, I am not arguing that there are not some important aspects of the social superego that are beneficial, for example the ethical and moral laws which shape society and protect its citizens; nevertheless, in wartime and its most recent manifestation, international terrorism, it is precisely these civilizing aspects of the social superego that are ignored or repressed. It seems to me that the failure of civilization historically to control the aggression, cruelty, and hatred that characterize war urgently requires a psychoanalytic explanation. Of course, I am speaking of psychic, not biological (survival of the fittest), aggression. In wartime the externalized superego of the state sanctions killing and violence that is not allowed in peacetime (in fact, such violence against others during peacetime would be considered criminal)—sanctions, in fact, the gratification of warring aggression, thus ensuring that acts of violence need not incur guilt. Why do we accept this? Psychoanalysis posits the idea that aggression is not behavioral but instinctual; not social but psychological. To quote Volkan, who follows Freud, "It is man's very nature itself." Obviously, it is vital that humanity find more mature, less primitive ways of dealing with our hatred and aggression than war, genocide, and international terrorism. The most characteristic thing about this kind of violence and cruelty is its collective mentality: war requires group co-operation, organization, and approval. Some theorists argue that one of the primary cohesive elements binding individuals into institutionalized human association is defence against psychotic anxiety. In *Group Psychology* Freud writes that "in a group the individual is brought under conditions which allow him to throw off the repressions of his unconscious instinctual impulses. The apparently new characteristics he then displays are in fact the manifestation of this unconscious, in which all that is evil in the human mind is contained as a predisposition" (74). Later in the same essay, when speaking of the individual and the group mind, Freud quotes Le Bon : "Isolated, he may be a cultivated individual; in a crowd, he is a barbarian—that is, a creature acting by instinct. He posseses the spontaneity, the violence, the ferocity, and also the enthusiasm and heroism of primitive beings" (77). War is a collective phenomenon that mobilizes our anxieties and allows our original sadistic fantasies of destructive omnipotence to be re-activated and projected onto "the enemy." Some critics have argued that we "need" enemies as external stabilizers of our sense of identity and inner control. It has also been argued that the militancy a particular group shows toward its enemies may partly mask the personal internal conflicts of each member of the group, and that they may therefore have an emotional investment in the maintenance of the enmity. **In other words, they need the enemy and are unconsciously afraid to lose it. This fits in with the well-known phenomenon of inventing an enemy when there is not one readily available**.

**War has a psychoanalytic root**

**Byles 3** (Joanna Montgomery, Professor English, University of Cyprus, *Journal for the Psychoanalysis of Culture and Society* 8.2 (2003) 208-213, Psychoanalysis and War: The Superego and Projective Identification).

The problem of warfare which includes genocide, and its most recent manifestation, international terrorism, brings into focus the need to understand how the individual is placed in the social and the social in the individual, Psychoanalytic theories of superego aggression, splitting, projection, and projective identification may be useful in helping us to understand the psychic links involved. It seems vital to me writing in the Middle East in September 2002 that we examine our understanding of what it is we understand about war, including genocide and terrorism. Some psychoanalysts argue that war is a necessary defence against psychotic anxiety (Fornari xx: Vulkan), and Freud himself first advanced the idea that war provided an outlet for repressed impulses. ("Why War'" 197). The problematic of these views is the individual \ need to translate internal psychotic anxieties into real external dangers so as to control them. It suggests that culturally warfare and its most recent- manifestation, international terrorism and the so-called "war on terrorism," may he a necessary object for internal aggression and not a patholn . Indeed, Fornari suggests that "war could be seen as an attempt at therapy, carried out by a social institution which, precisely by institutionalizing war, in-creases to gigantic proportions what is initially an elementary defensive mechanism of the ego iii the schizo-paranoid phase" (xvii-xviii). In other words, the history of war might represent the externalization and articulation of shared unconscious fantasies. This idea would suggest that the culture of war, genocide, and international terrorism provides objects of psychic need. If this is so, with. what can we replace them?

### Alt – Lacan = Politics

**Lacan’s theories can be applied to the political**

**Stavrakakis 99** (Yannis, *Lacan and the Political,* Visiting Professor, Department of Government, University of Essex, pages 4...9-10).

If the first three chapters aim at extracting the importance of the Lacanian conceptual and theoretical apparatus for political analysis and the theory of politics, the two chapters that follow are designed to demonstrate some of the ways in which this conceptual apparatus can lead to new challenging approaches to areas which are crucial for contemporary political theory and political praxis, namely the crisis of utopian politics and the ethical foundation of a radical democratic project. Here again, we shall argue that both a historical and theoretical analysis reveals that the politics of utopia— which has for long dominated our political horizon—lead to a set of dangers that no rigorous political analysis and political praxis should neglect. Its current crisis, instead of being the source of disappointment and political pessimism, creates the opportunity of ‘liberating’ our political imagination from the strait-jacket imposed by a fantasmatic ethics of harmony, and of developing further the democratic potential of this imagination in an age in which all sorts of xenophobic, neofascist andnationalist particularisms and fundamentalisms show again their ugly face. Lacanian theory can be one of the catalysts for these political ‘liberations’, simultaneously offering a non- foundational ethical grounding for their articulation.

**The alt is critical to a new form of politics --- much like the Nazis scapegoated the Jews, the affirmative is a false act that externalizes violence onto an other**

**Zizek 2k** – prof @ University of Ljubljana (Slavoj, Contingency, Hegemony, Universality, 124-127, ZR)

Now I can also answer the obvious counter-argument to this Lacanian notion of the act: if we define an act solely by the fact that its sudden emergence surprises/transforms its agent itself and, simultaneously, that it retroactively changes its conditions of (im)possibility, is not Nazism, then, an act par excellence? Did Hitler not ‘do the impossible', changing the entire field of what was considered `acceptable' in the liberal democratic universe? Did not a respectable middle-class petit bourgeois who, as a guard in a concentration camp, tortured Jews, also, accomplish what was considered impossible, in his previous ‘decent’ existence and acknowledge his ‘passionate attachment’ to sadistic torture? It is here that the notion of ‘traversing the fantasy’, and - on a different level - of transforming the constellation that generates social symptoms becomes crucial. An authentic act disturbs the underlying fantasy, attacking it from the point of `social symptom' (let us recall that Lacan attributed the invention of the notion of symptom to Marx!). The so-called `Nazi revolution', with its disavowal/displacement of the fundamental social antagonism ('class struggle' that divides the social edifice from within) - with its projection/externalization of the cause of social antagonisms into the figure of the Jew, and the consequent reassertion of the corporatist notion of society as an organic Whole - clearly avoids confrontation with social. antagonism; the ‘Nazi revolution’ is the exemplary case of a pseudo-change, of a frenetic activity in the course of which many things did change – ‘something was going on al1 the time’ - so that, precisely, something.- that which really matters - would not change; so that things would fundamentally 'remain the same'.

In short, an authentic act is not simply external with regard to the hegemonic symbolic field disturbed by it: an act is an act only with regard to some symbolic field, as intervention into it. That is to say: a symbolic field is always and by definition in itself 'decentred', structured around a central void/impossibility (a personal life-narrative, say, is a bricolage of ultimately failed attempts to come to terms with some trauma; a social edifice is an ultimately failed attempt to displace/obfuscate its constitutive antagonism); and an act disturbs the symbolic field into which it intervenes not out of nowhere, but precisely from the standpoint of this inherent impossibility, stumbling block, which is its hidden, disavowed structuring principle. In contrast to this authentic act which intervenes in the constitutive void, point of failure - or what Alain Badiou has called the 'symptomal torsion’ of a given constellation - the inauthentic act legitimizes itself through reference to the point of substantial fullness of a given contellation (on the political terrain: Race, True Religion, Nation...): it aims precisely at obliterating the last traces of the 'symptomal torsion' which disturbs the balance of that constellation.

One palpable political consequence of this notion of the act that has to intervene at the `symptomal torsion' of the structure (and also a proof that our position does not involve `economic essentialism') is that in each concrete constellation there is one touchv nodal point of contention which decides where one 'truly stands'. For example, in the recent struggle of the so-called `democratic opposition' in Serbia against the Milosevic regime, the truly touchy topic is the stance towards the Albanian majority in Kosovo: the great majority of the `democratic opposition' unconditionally endorse Milosevic’s anti-Albanian nationalist agenda, even accusing him of making compromises with the West and `betraying' Serb national interests in Kosovo. In the course of the student demonstrations against Milosevic's Socialist Party falsification of the election results in the winter of 1996, the Western media which closely followed events, and praised the revived democratic spirit in Serbia, rarely mentioned the fact that one of the demonstrators' regular slogans against the special police was `Instead of kicking us, go to Kosovo and kick out the Albanians!'. So - and this is my point - it is theoretically as well as politically wrong to claim that, in today's Serbia, 'anti-Albanian nationalism' is simply one among the `floating signifiers' that can be appropriated either by Milosevic's power bloc or by the opposition: the moment one endorses it, no matter how much one 'reinscribes it into the democratic chain of equivalences', one already accepts the terrain as defined by Milosevic, one - as it were - is already `playing his game'. In today's Serbia, the absolute sine qua non of an authentic political act would thus be to reject absolutely the ideologico-political topos of the Albanian threat in Kosovo.

Psychoanalysis is aware of a whole series of `false acts': psychotic-paranoiac violent passage a l'acte, hysterical acting out, obsessional self-hindering, perverse self-instrumentalization – all these acts are not simply wrong according to some external standards, they are immanently wrong since they can be properly grasped only as reactions to some disavowed trauma that they displace, repress, and so on. What we are tempted to say is that the Nazi anti-Semitic violence was `false' in the same way: all the shattering impact of this large-scale frenetic activity was fundamentally `misdirected', it was a kind of gigantic passage a l'acte betraying an inability to confront the real kernel of the trauma (the social antagonism). So what we are claiming is that anti-Semitic violence, say, is not only `factually wrong' (Jews are `not really like that', exploiting us and organizing a universal plot) and/or ‘morally wrong’ (unacceptable in terms of elementary standards of decency, etc.), but also `untrue’ in the sense of an inauthenticity which is simultaneously epistemological and ethical, just as an obsessional who reacts to his [sic] disavowed sexual fixations by engaging in compulsive defence rituals acts in an inauthentic way. Lacan claimed that even if the patient's wife is really sleeping around with other men, the patient's jealousy is still to be treated as a pathological condition; in a homologous way, even if rich Jews `really' exploited German workers, seduced their daughters, dominated the popular press, and so on, anti-Semitism is still an emphatically `untrue', pathological ideological condition - why? What makes it pathological is the disavowed subjective libidinal investment in the figure of the Jew – the way social antagonism is displaced-obliterated by being 'projected' into the figure of the Jew.

So - back to the obvious counter-argument to the Lacanian notion of the act: this second feature (for a gesture to count as an act, it must 'traverse the fantasy') is not simply a further, additional criterion, to be added to the first ('doing the impossible', retroactively rewriting its own conditions): if this second criterion is not fulfilled, the first is not really met either - that is to say; we are not actually `doing the impossible', traversing the fantasy towards the Real.

### Alt – Violence

**retag**

**Byles 3** (Joanna Montgomery, Professor English, University of Cyprus, *Journal for the Psychoanalysis of Culture and Society* 8.2 (2003) 208-213, Psychoanalysis and War: The Superego and Projective Identification).

The problem for us today is how to create the psychological climate of opinion. a mentality, that will reject war, genocide, and terrorism as viable solutions to internal and external situations of conflict; to recognize our projections for what they are-dangerously irresponsible psychic acts based on superego hatred and violence. We must challenge the way in which the State superego can manipulate our responses in its own interests, even take away our subjectivities. We should acknowledge and learn to displace the violence in ourselves in socially harmless ways, getting rid of our fears and anxieties of the other and of difference by relating and identifying with the other and thus creating the serious desire to live together in a peaceful world. What seems to be needed is for the superego to regain its developmental role of mitigating omniscient projective identification by ensuring an intact, integrated object world, a world that will be able to contain unconscious fears, hatred, and anxieties without the need for splitting and projection. As Rion has pointed out, omnipotence replaces thinking and omniscience replaces learning. We must learn to link our internal and external worlds so as to act as a container of the other's fears and anxieties, and thus in turn to encourage the other to reciprocate as a container of our hatreds and fears. **If war represents cultural formations that in turn represent objectifications of the psyche via the super-ego of the individual and of the State, then perhaps we can reformulate these psychic social mechanisms of projection and superego aggression**. Here, that old peace-tine ego and the reparative component of the individual and State superego will have to play a large part. The greater the clash of cultural formations-for example, Western Modernism and Islamic Fundamentalism-the more urgent the need. "The knowledge now most worth having" is an authentic way of internalizing what it is we under. rand about war and inter-national terrorism that will liberate us from the history of our collective traumatic past and the imperatives it has imposed on us. The inner psychic world of the individual has an enormously important adaptive role to play here in developing mechanisms of projective identification not as a means of damaging and destroying the other, but as a means of empathy, of containing the other, and in turn being contained. Furthermore, we should learn not to project too much into our group, and our nation, for this allows the group to tyrannize us, so that we follow like lost sheep. But speaking our minds takes courage because groups do nor like open dissenters. These radical psychic changes may be evolutionary rather than revolutionary, gradual rather than speedy: however, my proposition that understanding the other so that we can reduce her/his motivation to kill requires urgent action. **Peace is not just an absence of war, but a state of mind-**and, most importantly, a way of thinking.

**retag**

**Byles 3** (Joanna Montgomery, Professor English, University of Cyprus, *Journal for the Psychoanalysis of Culture and Society* 8.2 (2003) 208-213, Psychoanalysis and War: The Superego and Projective Identification).

As already mentioned, analysts such as Volkan and Erikson have written about the processes by which an enemy is dehumanized so as to provide the distance a group needs from its perceived enemy. First the group becomes preoccupied with the enemy according to the psychology of minor differences. Then mass regression occurs to permit the group to recover and reactivate more primitive methods. What they then use in this regressed state tends to contain aspects of childish (pre-oedipal) fury. The enemy is perceived more and more as a stereotype of bad and negative qualities. The use of denial allows a group to ignore the fact that its own externalizations and projections are involved in this process. The stereotyped enemy may be so despised as to be no longer human, and it will then be referred to in non-human terms. History teaches us that it was in this way that the Nazis perceived the Jews as vermin to be exterminated. As I write, Al Qaeda terrorist groups view all Americans as demons and infidels to be annihilated, and many Americans are comforted by demonizing all of bearded Islam. Many Israelis consider most Palestinians as dirt beneath their feet—sub-human—and most Palestinians think of most Israelis as despoilers of the land they are supposed to share. In other words, the problem of the mentality of war and of terrorism mobilizes our anxieties in such a way so as to prevent critical reality testing. If we could learn the enormously difficult and painful task of re-introjection, of taking back our projections, our hatreds, anxieties, and fears of the other and of difference, long before they harm the other, there might be a transition, a link, from the state sanctioned violence of war back to individual violence. We might learn to subvert negative projective identification into a positive identification as a means of empathizing with the other and thus containing difference. The violence of the individual could then be contained and sublimated in peaceful ways, such as reconciling and balancing competing interests by asking what exactly these opposing interests are and exploring what the dynamics, conscious and unconscious, are for the hatred of deep war-like antagonisms. In other words, we would need to change our relationship with the other, giving up the dangerously irresponsible habit of splitting, projective identification, and exclusivity by recognizing difference not antagonistically but through an inclusive process that recognises the totality of human relationships in a peaceful world. We might substitute for the libidinal object-ties involved in projective identification the re-introjection of the object into the ego, and thus reach a common feeling of sharing, of being part of the other, of empathy, in short. As Freud pointed out, the ego is altered by introjection, as suggested by his memorable formulation: "The shadow of the object has fallen on the ego."

### Alt – Disabilities (2NC Must Read)

The affirmative has the wrong starting point – we must not engage the plight of the disabled but rather engage the psyche of the non-disabled – only way to solve ableist society

Goodley 10 (Dan, Dept of Psychology Research Institute @ U of Toronto, “Disability Studies and Psychoanalysis: Time for the couch or culture?” <http://mmu.academia.edu/DanGoodley/Papers/309208/Disability_Studies_and_Psychoanalysis_Time_for_the_couch_or_culture>)JFS

However, over a number of years of reading psychology more closely, it has become apparent to me that some psychological theories may be of great use to the development of disability studies. Bastardising a quote from Franz Fanon: psychological theories may push us to explore the human attributes of the more objective historical and socio-economic conditions of disablism already well documented in the disability studies canon (e.g. Barton and Oliver, 1997; Barnes et al,1997). One of these psychologies, psychoanalysis, is a controversial choice; not least because of the ways in which psychoanalytic theories have contributed to the denigration of disabled or non-normative people. Nevertheless, I will argue in this paper that psychoanalysis and disability studies – or more correctly social psychoanalytic theories and critical disability studies – share much in common and can contribute to an analysis and deconstruction of disabling society. Just don’t tell the Bourdieu bastard in the library. This paper considers connections and tensions – the space between – psychoanalysis and disability studies. I will explore two social psychoanalytic encounters with disability.¶ splitting the subject ¶ , and¶ the disavowal of disability¶ .For you theory chicks and cocktail lovers alike: in this paper you will find a shot of Melanie Klein, a dash of Jacques Lacan and a mixer of critical disability studies. I tentatively conclude that social psychoanalytic disability studies can help us – whether we are on the couch or in culture – to theorise and challenge disablism, which Carol Thomas (2007: 73) defines as ‘a form of social oppression involving the social imposition of restrictions of activity on people with impairments and the socially engendered undermining of their psycho-emotional well being ¶ ’ [my italics].¶ The psyche in disability studies¶ The inspirational Indian disability scholar Anita Ghai (2006: 14-15) once commented: ‘the internalisation that I carried in an Indian culture accustomed me to seeing my disability as a personal quest and tragedy to be borne alone … I learnt to cope with the limitations, imposed by my impairment. The recurring anxiety was place in the realm of what Freud so aptly termed as the ‘unconscious’ (Ghai, 2006: 14-15).Anita’s words reminds us that the psyche – whether we locate it in the head, on the couch or in culture – is deeply associated with disablism. For critical disability studies scholars, though, questions are raised not simply about ‘the disabled psyche’ but, more importantly, about ‘the non-disabled psyche’. I want to suggest that our interest should lie not with the psyches of disabled people (Priests, medics and psychiatrists have tried to own those for years) but with the collective non-disabled psyche: the ways in which ‘non-disabled people and disablist culture symbolise, characterise, construct, gaze at, project, split off, react, repress and direct images of impairment and disability in ways that subjugate and, at times, terrorise disabled people whilst upholding the precarious autonomy of non-disabled people’.

### AT: Perm

**Minor changes like the affirmative are mutually exclusive with our Lacanian politics**

**McGowan 4** PhD from Ohio State English Department (Todd, 2004, “Introduction: Psychoanalysis after Marx”, *End of Dissatisfaction? Jacques Lacan and the Emerging Society of Enjoyment*”, p. 124-6) MH

In response to the command to enjoy, contemporary cynicism is an effort to gain distance from the functioning of power, to resist the hold that power has over us. Hence, the cynic turns inward and displays an indifference to external authorities, with the aim of self-sufficient independence. Symbolic authority—which would force the subject into a particular symbolic identity, an identity not freely chosen by the subject herself—is the explicit enemy of cynicism. To acknowledge the power of symbolic authority over one’s own subjectivity would be, in the eyes of the cynic, to acknowledge one’s failure to enjoy fully, making such an acknowledgment unacceptable. In the effort to refuse the power of this authority, one must eschew all the trappings of conformity. This is why the great Cynical philosopher Diogenes made a show of masturbating in public, a gesture that made clear to everyone that he had moved beyond the constraints of the symbolic law and that he would brook no barrier to his jouissance. By freely doing in public what others feared to do, Diogenes acted out his refusal to submit to the prohibition that others accepted. He attempted to demonstrate that the symbolic law had no absolute hold over him and that he had no investment in it. However, **seeming to be beyond the symbolic law and actually being beyond it are two** different—and, in fact, **opposed— things**, and this difference becomes especially important to recognize in the contemporary society of enjoyment. In the act of making a show of one’s indifference to the public law (in the manner of Diogenes and today’s cynical subject), one does not gain distance from that law, but **unwittingly reveals one’s investment in it**. Such a show is done for the look of the symbolic authority. The cynic stages her/his act publicly in order that symbolic authority will see it. Because it is staged in this way, we know that the cynic’s act—such as the public masturbation of Diogenes—represents a case of acting-out, rather than an authentic act, an act that suspends the functioning of symbolic authority. Acting-out always occurs on a stage, while the authentic act and authentic enjoyment—the radical break from the constraints of symbolic authority—occur unstaged, without reference to the Other’s look.9 In the History of Philosophy, Hegel makes clear the cynic’s investment in symbolic authority through his discussion of Plato’s interactions with Diogenes: In Plato’s house [Diogenes] once walked on the beautiful carpets with muddy feet, saying, “I tread on the pride of Plato.” “Yes, but with another pride,” replied Plato, as pointedly. When Diogenes stood wet through with rain, and the bystanders pitied him, Plato said, “If you wish to compassionate him, just go away. His vanity is in showing himself off and exciting surprise; it is what made him act in this way, and the reason would not exist if he were left alone.10 Though Diogenes attempts to act in a way that demonstrates his self-sufficiency, his distance from every external authority, what he attains, however, is far from self-sufficiency. As Plato’s ripostes demonstrate, **everything that the cynic does to distance himself from symbolic authority plays directly into the hands of that authority.**11 Here we see how cynicism functions symptomatically in the society of enjoyment, providing the illusion of enjoyment beyond social constraints while leaving these constraints completely intact. We don’t have to look twenty-five hundred years in the past for an example of cynicism’s hidden investment in symbolic authority: this investment is even more fully present in contemporary cynicism. It is especially clear in the cynicism of the antiauthority, discontented hacker working at a new internet company. The hacker is able to eschew all of the trappings of the traditional office labor: she/he can make her/his own hours, wear what she/he wants, listen to a walkman, and, in general, be her/his own boss. But nonetheless, this rejection of authority is wholly amenable to the functioning of the internet company. In fact, such a company thrives on it. It is not uncommon for internet companies to fire hackers when they lose their rebelliousness and become part of the corporate structure. Such companies want edgy product development that only a rebellious hacker can provide. The cynical worker works all the more effectively for the company—for the authority—in the guise of an opposition to structures of authority. Imagining her/himself as a rebel against tradition allows the hacker to become more creative, to spur the company on toward greater and greater profits. Contemporary cynicism at large works much like it does in the case of the hacker. The cynic rejects authority at the same time she/he devotes **all of her/his energies to helping it along**. The contemporary cynic’s rebellion is, in this way, not a brake upon the functioning of late capitalism, but its engine. The cynicism among subjects today thus indicates the extent to which the society of enjoyment leaves subjects bereft of the actual enjoyment that would break from the prevailing symbolic authority.

**Perm is self defeating – cannot reject utopianism while fantasizing about the utopia**

**Stavrakakis 99** (Yannis, *Lacan and the Political,* Visiting Professor, Department of Government, University of Essex, pages 116-117).

Since, however, Lacanian political theory aims at bringing to the fore, again and again, the lack in the Other, the same lack that utopian fantasy attempts to mask, it would be self-defeating, if not absurd, to engage itself in utopian or quasi-utopian fantasy construction. Is it really possible and consistent to point to the lack in the Other and, at the same time, to attempt to fill it in a quasi-utopian move? Such a question can also be posed in ethical or even strategic terms. It could be argued of course that Homer’s vision of a psychoanalytic politics does not foreclose the recognition of the impossibility of the social but that in his schema this recognition, and the promise to eliminate it (as part of a quasi-utopian regulative principle) go side by side;

that in fact this political promise is legitimised by the conclusions of psychoanalytic political theory. But this coexistence is nothing new. This recognition of the ‘impossibility of society’, of an antagonism that cross-cuts the social field, constitutes the starting point for almost every political ideology. Only if presented against the background of this ‘disorder’ the final harmonious ‘order’ promised by a utopian fantasy acquires hegemonic force. The problem is that all this schema is based on the elimination of the first moment, of the recognition of impossibility. The centrality of political dislocation is always repressed in favour of the second moment, the utopian promise. Utopian fantasy can sound appealing only if presented as the final solution to the problem that constitutes its starting point. In that sense, the moment of impossibility is only acknowledged in order to be eliminated. In Marx, for instance, the constitutivity of class struggle is recognised only to be eliminated in the future communist society. Thus, when Homer says that he wants to repeat Marx’s error today he is simply acknowledging that his psychoanalytic politics is nothing but traditional fantasmatic politics articulated with the use of a psychoanalytic vocabulary.

**Perm doesn’t solve – can’t accept any utopian politics**

**Stavrakakis, 99** (Yannis, *Lacan and the Political,* Visiting Professor, Department of Government, University of Essex, pages 118-119).

In fact, articulating Lacanian theory with fantasmatic politics is equivalent to affirming the irrelevance of Lacanian theory for radical politics since this articulation presupposes the repression of all the political insights implicit in Lacan’s reading and highlighted in this book. The alleged irrelevance of Lacan for radical politics is also the argument put forward by Collier in a recent article in *Radical Philosophy.* Collier’s argument is that since it is capitalism that shatters our wholeness and disempowers us (as if without capitalism we would be on the road to utopia; obviously, capitalism occupies the structural position of the antichrist in this sort of leftist preaching), then Lacan’s theory is, in fact, normalising capitalist damage, precisely because alienation is so deep for Lacan that nothing can be done to eliminate it (‘Lacan is deeply pessimistic, rejecting cure or *happiness* as possible goals’, my emphasis).19 Thus Lacan has nothing to offer radical politics. Something not entirely surprising since, according to Collier, psychological theory in general has no political implications whatsoever. The conclusion is predictable: ‘Let us go to Freud and Klein for our psychotherapy [Lacan is of course excluded] and to Marx and the environmental sciences for our politics, and not get our lines crossed’ (Collier, 1998:41–3). Surprisingly enough this is almost identical with Homer’s conclusion: Lacanian theory is OK as an analytical tool but let us go back to Marx for our ideological seminar and our utopian catechism!

It is clear that from a Lacanian point of view it is necessary to resist all such ‘reoccupations’ of traditional fantasmatic politics. At least this is the strategy that Lacan follows on similar occasions. Faced with the alienating dimension of every identification, Lacan locates the end of analysis beyond identification. Since utopian or quasi-utopian constructions function through identification it is legitimate, I think, to draw the analogies with the social field. If analysis resists the ‘reoccupation’ of the traditional strategy of identification—although it recognises its crucial, but alienating, role in the formation of subjectivity—why should psychoanalytic politics, after unmasking the crucial but alienating character of traditional, fantasmatic, identificatory politics, ‘reoccupy’ their ground? This rationale underlying the Lacanian position is not far away from what Beardsworth articulates as a political reading of Derrida. For Beardsworth, deconstruction also refuses to implicate itself in traditional politics, in the ‘local sense of politics’ in Beardsworth’s terminology:

In its affirmative refusal to advocate a politics, deconstruction forms, firstly, an account of why all political projects fail. Since the projection of any decision has ethical implications, deconstruction in fact generalizes what is meant by the political well beyond the local sense of politics. In this sense it becomes a radical ‘critique’ of institutions.

(Beardsworth, 1996:19)

Similarly, the radicality and political importance of the Lacanian critique depends on its ability to keep its distance from fantasmatic politics, from politics in the traditional sense; which is not the same as saying that psychoanalysis is apolitical: in fact, it becomes political precisely by being critical of traditional politics, exactly because, as argued in the previous chapter, the political is located beyond the utopian or quasi-utopian sedimentations of political reality.